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ABSTRACT: In the much-awaited Achmea judgment (of 6 March 2018, case C-284/16 [GC]), the Court 
of Justice held that investor-state tribunals (ISTs), “such as” the one under the Netherlands-Slovakia 
intra-EU bilateral investment treaty (BIT) are incompatible with EU law. In this arguably short judg-
ment, the Court of Justice consolidated its attitude towards the relationship between other interna-
tional courts and the EU legal order; it set new limits to Art. 344 TFEU; and, it expanded its list of 
tribunals that do not qualify as Member State courts or tribunals under Art. 267 TFEU. Nonethe-
less, whilst the Commission can rejoice that it can now clearly oblige Member States to terminate 
their intra-EU BITs, Achmea sends some worrying signals. The future of ISTs under Member State 
BITs with third countries is uncertain; so is the viability of the Investment Court System under the 
agreements with Canada and Vietnam, the future of the Multilateral Investment Court, and the 
overall coherence of the EU’s international investment law and policy. 
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I. The “context” 
Certain decisions of the Court of Justice issued in these past few years represent verita-
ble milestones for the EU’s relationship with the outside world and international in-
vestment law (IIL). In opinion 2/131 the Court provided the most detailed description of 
the ways in which other international tribunals must respect the autonomy of EU law, 
 
* Postdoctoral Fellow, PluriCourts, University of Oslo, szilard.gaspar-szilagyi@jus.uio.no. This work 
was partly supported by the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence funding 
scheme, project number 223274. 
1 Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014. See P. ECKHOUT, Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession 
to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?, in Fordham International Law Journal, 2015, p. 
955 et seq.; see also D. HALBERSTAM, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward, in German Law Journal, 2015, p. 105 et seq., and C. KRENN, 
Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession after Opinion 2/13, in 
German Law Journal, 2015, p. 147 et seq. 
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while opinion 2/152 clarified the EU’s external competences over trade agreements that 
include investment chapters. This year’s Achmea3 sends a clear message to the Member 
States and investor-state tribunals (ISTs) that ISTs under intra-EU bilateral investment 
treaties (intra-EU BITs) are incompatible with the EU legal order. 
Intra-EU BITs were predominantly concluded in the late 1980s and 1990s as regular 
BITs between EU Member States, on the one side, and Central and Eastern European 
countries, on the other side. However, following the accession of the latter to the EU, it 
became doubtful whether the almost 200,4 now intra-EU BITs, were compatible with EU 
law. Furthermore, Investors from predominantly older Member States became frequent 
users of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms found in intra-EU BITs 
and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) against newer Member States. More recently, EU 
investors also began using the ECT to launch investor-state arbitrations against older 
Member States, such as Germany, Italy and Spain,5 the latter two witnessing a veritable 
surge of cases brought against them. The importance of determining whether the sub-
stantive and procedural guarantees provided by these agreements were compatible 
with EU law was one of the reasons why the EU Commission embarked on a campaign 
to end these agreements, even bringing infringement proceedings against several 
Member States to terminate their intra-EU BITs.6  
The recently delivered judgment of the Grand Chamber in Achmea at least clarifies 
that the procedural guarantees of intra-EU BITs, in the form of investor-state arbitral 
tribunals, are incompatible with EU law. The case has already resulted in a multitude of 
online commentaries, some analysing the Court’s verdict from the perspective of EU 
law,7 while others look at it from the perspective of international investment law (IIL).8 
This Insight will provide a double perspective. On the one hand, it explains how this 
 
2 Court of Justice, opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017. See M. CREMONA, Shaping EU Trade Policy post-
Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2018, p. 231 et seq. 
3 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 March 2018, case C-284/16, Achmea BV [GC]. 
4 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Intra-EU BITs and Intra-EU Dis-
putes, 7 March 2016, investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org. 
5 Currently there are 43 such cases brought against Spain. See UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settle-
ment Navigator Spain, investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org. 
6 H. LENK, L. RÖNNELID, J. DAHLQUIST, The Infringement Proceedings over Intra-EU Investment Treaties – 
An Analysis of the Case Against Sweden, in Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2016. 
7 H. SCHEPEL, From Conflicts-Rules to Field Preemption: Achmea and the Relationship Between EU 
Law and International Investment Law and Arbitration, in European Law Blog, 23 March 2018, european-
lawblog.eu; C. ECKES, Don’t Lead with Your Chin! If Member States Continue with the Ratification of CETA, 
they Violate European Union Law, in European Law Blog, 13 March 2018, europeanlawblog.eu; B. HESS, A 
European Law Reading of Achmea, in Conflict of Laws.net, 8 March 2018, conflictoflaws.net. 
8 P. NIEMELÄ, Achmea – A Perspective from International (Investment) Law, in European Law Blog, 15 
March 2018, europeanlawblog.eu; N. LAVRANOS, Black Tuesday: The End of Intra-EU BITs, in Arbitration 
Blog, 7 March 2018, arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com; S. HINDELANG, The Limited Immediate Effects of 
CJEU’s Achmea Judgment, in Verfassungsblog, 9 March 2018, verfassungsblog.de. 
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case fits into the line of cases of the Court that define the relationship between the EU 
legal order and other international tribunals. On the other hand, it looks at how Ach-
mea will affect the EU’s international investment policy. As Hess notes, “Achmea is pri-
marily about the primacy of Union law in international dispute settlement and only in 
the second place about investment arbitration”.9 
II. The background of the case  
The case between the Dutch investor, Achmea BV, and the Slovak Republic has its roots 
in an investor-state dispute. Prior to the case before the Court of Justice, the Dutch in-
vestor initiated a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
arbitration against Slovakia in 2008, pursuant to Art. 8 of the 1992 Netherlands-Slovakia 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (NL-SK BIT).10 The dispute arose due to Slovakia’s 2006 
measure to reverse partly the liberalization of the private sickness insurance market, 
which it had liberalized in 2004. The investor claimed before the IST that the said meas-
ure had caused damages to its Slovak investments. In turn, Slovakia objected to the ju-
risdiction of the IST, arguing that after its accession to the EU in 2004, Art. 8 of the NL-SK 
BIT became incompatible with EU Law. The arbitral tribunal rejected Slovakia’s objec-
tions11 and held in favour of the investor. It ordered Slovakia to pay damages in the 
amount of 22.1 million euros, for breaching the fair and equitable treatment standard 
under the BIT and the obligation thereunder to ensure the free transfer of payments.12 
Slovakia’s attempts to set aside the award at the seat of arbitration in Germany 
were unsuccessful. The Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt (Oberlandsgericht Frankfurt 
am Main) dismissed Slovakia’s action. Slovakia appealed the decision to the Federal 
Court of Justice of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), which decided to refer three 
questions to the Court of Justice. In essence, the BGH asked whether Arts 344, 267, and 
18 TFEU precluded the application of a provision in an intra-EU BIT that provided for in-
vestor-state arbitration. Nonetheless, the BGH doubted whether the IST provisions un-
der the BIT were in fact incompatible with the three Articles of the TFEU.13 
 
9 B. HESS, A European Law Reading of Achmea, cit. 
10 The Bilateral Investment Treaty was originally concluded with Czechoslovakia, but after its dissolu-
tion, both countries succeeded the original BIT. 
11 Permanent Court of Arbitration, award of 26 October 2010 on jurisdiction, arbitrability and sus-
pension, case no. 2008-13, Achmea BV v. The Slovak Republic. 
12 Permanent Court of Arbitration, award of 7 December 2012, case no. 2008-13, Achmea BV v. The 
Slovak Republic. 
13 Achmea BV [GC], cit., paras 15-22. 
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III. The Court of Justice sticks to its case law 
Before looking at the main arguments of the Court, some preliminary remarks are 
needed. First, what strikes the eye is the succinct and somewhat laconic fashion in 
which the Court answered the questions referred to it. Unlike the extensive opinion of 
AG Wathelet,14 the Court decided in a mere thirty paragraphs that the IST mechanism 
under the NL-SK BIT is incompatible with EU law. Second, the rendering of the judgment 
by the Grand Chamber and the intervention of 16 Member States evidence the im-
portance of this judgment. 
Looking at the Court’s arguments, one can split them into two main categories: 
those that relate to the characteristic of the EU legal order, and those that relate to the 
features of intra-EU ISTs. 
Concerning the features of the EU legal order, the Court used the approach it consoli-
dated in opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). The Court relied on a set of arguments based on the autonomy of the EU 
legal order, its special features, the principles of mutual trust and sincere cooperation, as 
well as the need to ensure the uniform and effective interpretation of EU law. The Court 
first reiterated its long-standing case law that an international agreement cannot affect 
the allocation of powers under the EU Treaties and the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
According to the Court, the autonomy of EU law is enshrined in particular in Art. 344 TFEU, 
under which Member States undertake not to submit a dispute that involves the interpre-
tation or application of the EU Treaties to a method of dispute settlement other than 
those provided for in the EU Treaties.15 The Court then argued that the autonomy of EU 
law – with respect to both Member State law and international law – is justified by the es-
sential characteristics of the EU legal order and its constitutional structure, such as the 
primacy of EU law and its direct effect.16 Next, the Court held that Member States share a 
set of common values, which justifies the existence of mutual trust. Furthermore, the 
principle of sincere cooperation under Art. 4, para. 3, TEU obliges Member States to en-
sure the application and respect of EU law. Lastly, the EU judicial system – comprised of 
the CJEU and the national courts –, a keystone of which is the system of preliminary refer-
ences established under Art. 267 TFEU, must ensure the full application of EU law, as well 
as its consistent and uniform interpretation. 
The Court then turned to the characteristics of the IST under the NL-SK BIT. It first 
noted that Art. 8, para. 6, of the BIT allowed the arbitral tribunal to apply the law of the 
contracting parties and international agreements between them, both of which include 
 
14 Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 19 September 2017, case C-284/16, Achmea BV; see A. CARTA, 
L. ANKERSMIT, AG Whatelet in C-284/16 Achmea: Saving ISDS?, in European Law Blog, 8 January 2018, euro-
peanlawblog.eu. 
15 Achmea BV [GC], cit., para. 32. 
16 Ibid., para. 33.  
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EU law. Therefore, such an arbitral tribunal could be called “on to interpret or indeed 
apply EU law”, including the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital.17 
In light of this, the Court had to ascertain whether such arbitral tribunals are situated in 
the EU judicial system. This would ensure that their decisions are subject to “mecha-
nisms capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the EU”.18 
The Court found that this was not the case, since the arbitral tribunal was not part 
of the judicial systems of the Netherlands or Slovakia. Therefore, it could not be classi-
fied as a Member State “court or tribunal” under Art. 267 TFEU and it could not make a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.19 The IST was also not a court common to 
several Member States, such as the Benelux Court of Justice. In such circumstances, it 
had to be ascertained, whether an award made by such an arbitral tribunal was subject 
to review by a court of a Member State, thus ensuring that the “questions of EU law 
which the tribunal may have to address can be submitted to the Court” via the prelimi-
nary reference procedure.20 Since the original arbitration was brought under the 
UNCITRAL rules, the arbitral tribunal was free to choose its seat and the law applicable 
to the procedure governing the judicial review of the validity of the award. In this case, 
the German law applicable to the procedure prescribed limited grounds for the annul-
ment of the award, in particular the consistency with public policy of the recognition 
and enforcement of the award. The Court admitted that in the context of commercial 
arbitration it had previously held that the “requirements of efficient arbitration pro-
ceedings” called for the limited review of arbitral awards.21 However, commercial arbi-
tration had to be differentiated from investor state arbitration.  
The Court held that arbitration proceedings, “such as those referred to in Art. 8 of the 
BIT” were different from commercial arbitration, because in case of the former, Member 
States, not private parties, had agreed to remove those disputes from their judicial sys-
tems and thus the EU system.22 In such circumstances, the considerations concerning the 
limited grounds for review of commercial arbitral awards did not apply to intra-EU ISTs. 
In conclusion, the ISDS mechanism under the NL-SK BIT could not safeguard the full 
effectiveness of EU law. Furthermore, such a mechanism would also call into question 
the principle of mutual trust between the Member States, as well as the preservation of 
the specific characteristics of the EU legal system and its autonomy. Thus, Arts 267 and 
344 TFEU had to be interpreted as precluding an IST under an intra-EU BIT, such as the 
one in the present case. 
 
17 Ibid., para. 42. 
18 Ibid., para. 43.  
19 Ibid., para. 49. 
20 Ibid., para. 50.  
21 Ibid., para. 54. 
22 Ibid., paras 54-55.  
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IV. Achmea and the court’s case law on other international 
tribunals 
In its capacity as the constitutional architect of a new legal order,23 the Court of Justice has 
not only defined the relationship between the EU and the Member State legal orders, but it 
has also created an intricate case-law on the relationship between the EU legal order and 
international law. These cases define: a) the relationship between EU law and other inter-
national tribunals;24 b) the relationship of EU law with international agreements/customary 
international law and their effects in the EU legal order;25 and c) the effects of international 
decisions in the EU legal order.26 Achmea fits into the first line of cases.  
The underlying idea of these cases – also reiterated in para. 57 of Achmea - is that, 
in principle, EU law does not prohibit the EU and its Member States to conclude interna-
tional agreements that set up courts meant to interpret the said agreements, provided 
such courts do not interfere with the autonomy and special features of the EU legal or-
der.27 Nevertheless, because of the latter condition, the Court of Justice over the years 
has found several international tribunals to be incompatible with EU law, such as the 
proposed Court for the European Economic Area28 (which later lead to the acceptance 
of the European Free Trade Association Court),29 the proposed European Patent 
Court,30 or the EU’s accession to the ECHR.31 It is also worth noting that the EU is subject 
to the jurisdictions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. However, the Court of Justice did not pronounce itself on the 
compatibility of these dispute settlement mechanisms with EU law, since it was not 
asked for an opinion on their compatibility with EU law or the questions referred for an 
opinion under Art. 218, para, 11, TFEU did not address the adjudicatory mechanism.32  
 
23 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 February 1963, case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, p. 2. 
24 Court of Justice: opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991; opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011; opinion 2/13, cit. 
For an overview see S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, A Standing Investment Court under TTIP from the Perspective of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, in Journal of World Investment and Trade, 2016, p. 204 et seq. 
25 Court of Justice: judgment of 30 April 1974, case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgium; judgment of 9 Feb-
ruary 1982, case 270/80, Polydor Limited v. Harlequin Records; judgment of 21 December 2011, case C-
366/10, Air Transport Association of America. 
26 Court of Justice, judgment of 9 September 2008, joined cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, FIAMM 
and Fedon v. Council. 
27 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, The CJEU Strikes Again in Achmea. Is this the end of investor-State arbitration 
under intra-EU BITs?, in International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 7 March 2018, world-
tradelaw.typepad.com. 
28 Opinion 1/91, cit. 
29 Court of Justice, opinion 1/92 of 10 April 1992. 
30 Opinion 1/09, cit. 
31 Opinion 2/13, cit. 
32 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, A Standing Investment Court, cit., p. 708; Court of Justice, opinion 2/94 of 15 No-
vember 1994. Nevertheless, the CJEU can diminish the internal effects of decisions of other international 
courts by not granting them direct effect. 
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Thus, before one might conclude that the Court of Justice is hostile towards inves-
tor-state arbitration, one must understand that the Court is quite protective of its own 
jurisdiction against other international tribunals and courts,33 regardless of whether 
they are long-standing regional human rights courts or ad hoc arbitral tribunals. 
The brief manner in which the Court decided that the intra-EU IST was incompatible 
with EU law is also somewhat puzzling, if one looks at the Court’s case law on the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association and European Economic Area Courts (respectively, EFTA 
Court and EEA Court), the European Patent Court or the European Court of Human 
Rights. Compared to Achmea, the previous cases are lengthy and the arguments of the 
Court are much more detailed. As the cases progressed, so did the number of condi-
tions – set out by the Court for an extra-EU court to be compatible with EU law – in-
crease. In these cases, the Court also embarks on a thorough analysis of each condition. 
For example, opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the ECHR spans over 200 para-
graphs and the Court sets out a multitude of conditions. The Court then thoroughly ex-
amines whether the accession agreement meets each of these conditions. On the other 
hand, in Achmea the Court heavily relies on opinion 2/13 (referenced seven times) and 
the conditions laid out in it, such as: the protection of the autonomy of EU law, the spe-
cial features of the EU legal order, or the need to ensure the uniform and effective in-
terpretation of EU law. Yet, a detailed analysis – comparable to the one in opinion 2/13 – 
of how the IST meets these conditions is lacking. As Hess notes, in Achmea “it is much 
more the outcome than the line of arguments that counts”.34 Because of this approach, 
several lingering questions need to be addressed. 
iv.1. A real risk of interpreting and applying EU law 
One of the decisive arguments used by the Court to find an incompatibility between the 
intra-EU IST and EU law referred to the real risk of an intra-EU IST award upsetting the 
uniform and effective interpretation and application of EU law. As the Court noted, be-
cause of the very limited possibilities to review IST awards,35 there is no adequate 
mechanism to control how those tribunals might have interpreted and applied EU law. 
One could of course argue that the very fact that this case arose from a preliminary ref-
erence that concerned questions on the relationship of EU law and intra-EU ISTs is a 
clear indication that such a control mechanism exists. Nonetheless, such an argument 
would only apply in cases similar to the present one, in which the law of the seat of ar-
bitration allows for a limited review of the award and the case arose under the 
UNCITRAL rules. In a case brought under the ICSID Convention or in case the country of 
 
33 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, The CJEU Strikes Again in Achmea, cit. 
34 B. HESS, A European Law Reading of Achmea, cit. 
35 Art. 52 of the ICSID Convention; Art. 5 of the New York Convention. 
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the seat of arbitration does not allow for a review of the arbitral award, such a control 
mechanism would not exist.  
If such a control mechanism is lacking, then Member States might very well have to 
enforce an award that interprets EU law in a different way than the Court of Justice, which 
would result in some Member States applying EU law concepts in a different way than 
others. Thus, the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law would be in jeopardy. For exam-
ple, during the arbitration that preceded the case before the Court of Justice, Slovakia ar-
gued that the provisions of the BIT were inapplicable because of the operation of Art. 30 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning incompatibilities be-
tween successive treaties.36 When dismissing Slovakia’s arguments, the arbitral tribunal 
held that no rule of EU law prohibits investor-state arbitration and then went on to inter-
pret Art. 344 TFEU as not applying to disputes initiated by private parties against EU 
Member States.37 In the same award on jurisdiction, the IST extensively discussed the 
substantive protections offered by the BIT and the extent to which the freedoms guaran-
teed by EU law, such as the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment, 
overlapped. This application and interpretation of provisions of the EU Treaties by an IST 
might explain why the Court of Justice felt the need in Achmea, a case couched in consti-
tutional terms, to mention that an IST might risk interpreting and applying EU law provi-
sions, such as those on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.38 
These two examples illustrate that ISTs can, and do interpret and apply EU law. 
It also needs to be mentioned that under Art. 8, para. 7, of the NL-SK BIT the arbitral 
award “shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute”. As the present case illus-
trates, when arbitrating the case under the UNCITRAL rules the grounds for reviewing the 
validity of the award by a Member State court can be very limited. If this case were decided 
pursuant to the ICSID Convention, then a domestic court could not even review the award. 
Thus, in practice the interpretations of the IST would result in a binding interpretation of EU 
law, which – as the CJEU stressed many times – is an exclusive prerogative of the CJEU. 
iv.2.  Setting new limits for Art. 344 TFEU 
Art. 344 TFEU forbids Member States to “submit a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided 
for” in the EU Treaties. In Mox Plant the Court held that this provision covers Member 
State-Member State disputes that concern the interpretation and application of EU 
law,39 while in opinion 2/13 the Court argued that the possibility of the European Court 
 
36 Permanent Court of Arbitration, award on jurisdiction, Achmea, cit., para. 268. 
37 Ibid., paras 272-276. 
38 Achmea BV [GC], cit., para. 42. 
39 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 May 2006, case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant) [GC], 
paras 123 and 132. 
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of Human Rights to hear disputes between EU Member States undermines the re-
quirement set out in Art. 344 TFEU.40 In opinion 1/09 on the European Patent Court, the 
Court held that Art. 344 TFEU did not cover disputes between private parties, since the 
prohibition is aimed at Member States.41 Academics thus began to wonder whether this 
provision also extended to private party-Member State disputes.42 The IST in Achmea v. 
Slovakia,43 the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt,44 and the BGH45 all held that Art. 344 
TFEU did not cover investor-Member State disputes. 
Given this uncertainty, the first question the BGH asked the Court of Justice was 
whether Art. 344 TFEU precluded the application of the intra-EU BIT’s provisions on in-
vestor-state arbitration. The Court answered it in the affirmative. In the final part of the 
judgment, it held that Art. 344 TFEU, together with Art. 267 TFEU, precludes an IST un-
der an intra-EU BIT, “such as” the one in Art. 8 of the NL-SK BIT.46 Thus, it set a new limit 
to Art. 344: investor-state arbitration under intra-EU BITs. 
Nevertheless, the way in which the Court arrived at this conclusion is not entirely sat-
isfying. Given the nature of the question referred to it, one would have expected the Court 
to embark on a detailed examination of Art. 344 TFEU, as it has done in Mox Plant and 
opinion 1/09, to ascertain whether the text, context and purpose of this Article allowed for 
or precluded investor-Member State arbitration. Instead, the Court chose a broad, formal-
istic line of arguments based on the autonomy of EU law. It only briefly mentioned Art. 
344 TFEU in para. 32 of the judgment, as an embodiment of the autonomy of the EU legal 
order but did not embark on a thorough analysis of the wording of the provision.  
Uncertainties also linger regarding the compatibility of other ISTs with EU law, such 
as ISTs under Member State BITs with third countries, the Investment Court System 
(ICS) under the agreements with Canada and Vietnam, or the soon to be negotiated 
Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).47 Would Art. 344 TFEU preclude them as well? If 
one looks at the way the Court answered the German court’s question on Art. 344, by 
couching the provision in the overall autonomy argument, then the conclusion is yes. 
 
40 Opinion 2/13, cit., paras 205-208.  
41 Opinion 1/09, cit., para. 63; see S. ØBY JOHANSEN, The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opin-
ion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences, in German Law Journal, 2015, p. 169 et seq. 
42 K. VON PAPP, Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member State Courts Bridge the Jurisdic-
tional Divide between Investment Tribunals and the ECJ? A Plea for Direct Referral from Investment Tri-
bunals to the ECJ, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, p. 1039 et seq.  
43 Permanent Court of Arbitration, award on jurisdiction, Achmea, cit., para. 276. 
44 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, decision of 10 May 2012, case 26 SchH 11/10, BeckRS 2012, 
p. 10291. 
45 Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 3 March 2016, case I ZB 2/15, paras 30-39; Achmea BV [GC], cit., 
para. 15. 
46 Achmea BV [GC], cit., para. 60. 
47 Council of the European Union, Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral 
Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 20 March 2018. 
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Any international arbitral tribunal, be it in an intra-EU BIT or a BIT with third countries, 
has the potential of interpreting and applying EU law when a dispute that concerns EU 
law is submitted before it. As I have previously argued, the presence of a provision, such 
as the one in CETA, according to which the ICS shall apply “domestic law” as fact, not 
law, does not ensure that in practice an IST will not interpret and apply EU law in its 
award, the enforcement of which is binding.48 
This argument might also hold true if the MIC would not be a unidirectional mecha-
nism to settle disputes, such as traditional ISTs, but it would allow the State to bring a 
case against a foreign investor as well. As Von Papp has argued, Art. 344 TFEU can sup-
port a more expansive reading that could accommodate all types of investor-State dis-
putes.49 The key here lies in the possibility that a foreign tribunal would interpret and 
apply EU law, without a mechanism to ask the Court of Justice beforehand how to do so. 
iv.3.  Not a “court or tribunal of a Member State” under Art. 267 TFEU 
The Court also held that Art. 267 TFEU precluded an IST under an intra-EU BIT, such as 
the one in the NL-SK BIT. Unlike in the case of Art. 344 TFEU, the Court spent several 
paragraphs explaining why the IST under the intra-EU BIT did not qualify as a “court or 
tribunal” of a Member State under Art. 267.50 
The Court followed two lines of reasoning. The first referred to the location of the IST, 
whether it was “situated within the judicial system of the EU”.51 If this were the case, the 
tribunal would be subject to “mechanisms capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the 
rules of the EU”.52 The IST in question did not meet this criterion, since it was not part of 
the judicial systems of the Netherlands or Slovakia, precisely because of its exceptional 
nature. The second line of reasoning referred to the “functions” of the referring tribunal 
and whether it was common to several Member States. According to the Court, the Bene-
lux Court of Justice could refer a question to it, since it was common to a number of 
Member States and it was tasked with the interpretation of legal rules common to the 
three Benelux countries.53 The IST, on the other hand, was not common to several Mem-
ber States and did not have “links” to the Member States similar to the Benelux Court. 
How do these two conditions compare to the existing case law of the Court? Re-
garding the location of the referring tribunal, in a previous paper I reserved my doubts 
whether this is a condition consistently required by the Court.54 For example, in Miles et 
al. v. European Schools the CJEU refused a reference from the Complaints Board of Eu-
 
48 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, A Standing Investment Court, cit., pp. 728-729. 
49 K. VON PAPP, Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”, cit., pp. 1053-1054. 
50 Achmea BV [GC], cit., paras 43-49. 
51 Ibid., para. 43. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., para. 48. 
54 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, The CJEU Strikes Again in Achmea, cit. 
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ropean Schools, because this international litigation body was located “outside” both 
the EU and the Member State systems.55 On the other hand, in opinion 1/91 and opin-
ion 1/00 the Court of Justice held that courts or tribunals, other than those of Member 
States, could refer questions to it for a preliminary ruling, provided the answers given 
by it were binding on the referring courts.56 In other words, part of the Court’s case law 
allows for references from “external” courts, not part of the Member States’ legal sys-
tems, under certain conditions.  
Furthermore, the Court did not discuss the conditions it set out in its Nordsee juris-
prudence57 for domestic arbitral tribunals that make a preliminary reference. The Court 
allows such references, if the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals is mandatory and ex-
clusive, and the disputing parties cannot influence the jurisdiction and set-up of the ar-
bitral tribunal.58 If the Court had considered these criteria in Achmea, the IST under the 
NL-SK BIT would have failed to meet them, since its jurisdiction was not exclusive or 
mandatory, and the disputing parties each chose one of the arbitrators. 
In conclusion, it seems that investor-state tribunals, whether intra- or extra-EU, would 
not qualify as domestic courts or tribunals under Art. 267 TFEU, since they are purposely 
placed outside of the EU judicial system, they are not common to several Member States, 
and they are not tasked with ensuring the uniform interpretation of the law in several 
Member States. Nonetheless, what about a future MIC to which all Member States and 
the EU would be a party? One could argue that such a world investment court would qual-
ify as a “tribunal common to several Member States”. Thus, the Court of Justice could ac-
cept a preliminary reference from it, provided its decision was binding on the MIC.  
iv.4. Nothing on Art. 18 TFEU 
In its third question, the German Court asked the Court of Justice whether Art. 18 TFEU, 
on the prohibition of “any discrimination on grounds of nationality”, precluded the appli-
cation of the IST in question. The Court exercising its judicial economy did not answer this 
question. For now, one can only speculate whether Art. 18 also precludes intra-EU ISTs. 
According to the discrimination argument, in the intra-EU context the investors of a 
Member State that had concluded a BIT with the host-Member State have an advantage 
over investors from a third Member State, since they can resort to an extra means of 
dispute resolution, the IST. The BGH noted that in this case discrimination would only 
occur if the nationals/investors of the third Member State were in an “objectively com-
 
55 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 June 2011, case C-196/09, Miles et al. v. European Schools, paras 37-39. 
56 Opinion 1/91, cit., paras 59-65; Court of Justice, opinion 1/00 of 18 April 2002, para. 33. 
57 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 March 1982, case 102/81, Nordsee v. Reederei. 
58 M. BROBERG, N. FENGER, Preliminary Reference to the European Court of Justice, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 84. 
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parable situation”.59 According to the referring court, this was not so in the present case 
“since the fact that the reciprocal rights and obligations apply only to nationals of the 
two contracting Member States is a consequence that is inherent in the bilateral 
agreements concluded between them”.60 AG Wathelet also found no incompatibility 
with Art. 18 TFEU, drawing on parallels with double taxation agreements.61 
As with other cases of discrimination, the answer hinges on what elements (per-
sons, products, services) are in a comparable or similar situation. If one follows the ar-
guments of the BGH, then the investors of the third Member State would not be in a 
comparable situation with the other EU investors, because their Member State of na-
tionality had not concluded a BIT with the host Member State. In other words, what one 
is comparing is whether the investors’ Member State of nationality had or had not con-
cluded an intra-EU BIT with the host Member State. However, one can argue that what 
needs to compared is in fact the remedies that EU investors from two Member States 
that invest in another Member State have when the latter Member State enacts a 
measure that harms them. 
The same could also hold true for BITs with non-EU countries, since the foreign in-
vestor from the non-EU country would have an advantage over an investor from an EU 
Member State when both invest in another EU Member State. The answer of whether 
such a BIT would breach Art. 18 TFEU hinges once again on what we compare. If we 
compare the judicial remedies the non-EU investor has in a host EU Member State 
compared to an EU investor from another Member State, then the non-EU investor def-
initely has an advantage. However, if we compare the remedies an EU investor has in 
the non-EU country, compared to what the non-EU investor has in a host EU Member 
State, then both investors (the EU and the non-EU) have the same opportunities: do-
mestic remedies or the IST. 
V. Achmea and its implications for the EU’s investment law and 
policy 
The Achmea judgment also constitutes another element of the puzzle that consists of 
the Court’s growing jurisprudence on the EU’s investment law and policy. First, prior to 
Lisbon, the Court found that Austria, Finland, and Sweden62 breached their Art. 351 
TFEU (ex-Art. 307 TEC) obligations for failing to take the appropriate steps to eliminate 
the incompatibilities between the provisions on the transfer of capital in some of their 
 
59 Achmea BV [GC], cit., para. 22. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Opinion of AG Wathelet, Achmea, cit., paras 67-80.  
62 Court of Justice: judgment of 3 March 2009, case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria; judgment of 19 
November 2009, case C-118/07, Commission v. Finland; judgment of 3 March 2009, judgment of 3 March 
2009, case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden. 
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BITs with third countries and EU law. Then, in opinion 2/15 the Court clarified that the 
provisions of the EU-Singapore FTA on portfolio investments and ISDS are under shared 
competence. Now, we know that ISTs found in intra-EU BITs, such as the ones in the NL-
SK BIT, are incompatible with EU law. What next? What will happen to the pending Micu-
la cases before the General Court,63 to opinion 1/1764 concerning the compatibility of 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) IST with EU law, or the soon 
to be negotiated MIC? Furthermore, how will Achmea affect pending and future inves-
tor-state arbitral proceedings? Let us briefly look at some of these questions. 
v.1.  What about ISTs with Third Countries? 
Achmea concerned the compatibility of the IST under Art. 8 of the NL-SK BIT with EU 
law. However, the Court did not limit its holdings to this specific case. Instead, it men-
tioned eight times65 that its holdings apply to tribunals “such as” the one in the NL-SK 
BIT. On the one hand, this means that any IST under an intra-EU BIT, “such as” the one 
under the NL-SK BIT, is incompatible with EU law.66 On the other hand, this also raises 
the question whether an IST that is not “such as” the one in Achmea would also be in-
compatible with EU law. The answer to this question is important for the fate of ISTs 
found in Member State BITs with third countries, the Investment Court System and the 
proposed Multilateral Investment Court. 
The following paragraphs look at some of the defining characteristics of the IST un-
der the NL-SK BIT and how the above-mentioned – existing or proposed – arbitral tribu-
nals compare to it. 
Firstly, the arbitral tribunal in Achmea was set up in an intra-EU setting. Thus, if the de-
fining feature for “such as” is that the IST is included in an intra-EU BIT, then tribunals set 
up under BITs with third countries, the ICS, and the proposed MIC cannot be regarded 
“such as” the one in the present case. Therefore, they might still be compatible with EU law. 
However, if the ISTs place in an intra or extra-EU BITs is irrelevant to define “such as”, then 
the afore-mentioned ISTs might be incompatible with EU law if one looks at other features. 
Secondly, and very importantly, the Court mentioned that its case law on commer-
cial arbitration did not apply to the IST in case, because unlike in commercial arbitra-
tion, through BITs the Member States agree to “remove from the jurisdiction of their 
own courts” certain disputes.67 This argument is very similar to the one used by the 
Court in opinion 1/09. According to this argument, by conferring jurisdiction to the Eu-
ropean Patent Court over a significant amount of potential cases regarding patents, the 
 
63 General Court, joined cases T-704/15, T-694/15 and T-646/14, Micula v. Commission, still pending. 
64 Court of Justice, opinion 1/17, still pending. 
65 Achmea BV [GC], cit., paras 31, 43, 49, 50, 55 (twice), 60, and the operative part. 
66 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, The CJEU Strikes Again in Achmea, cit. 
67 Achmea BV [GC], cit., para. 55. 
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Member States would “divest” their own courts of the possibility of handling these cases 
in favour of a court outside the European legal system.68 In other words, any 
court/tribunal located outside of the EU judicial system to which Member States divest 
cases - that can otherwise be handled by their national courts - is in principle incompat-
ible with EU law. This would include ISTs under BITs with third countries and the ICS. 
The MIC might be able to circumvent this requirement if investors were first obliged to 
exhaust local remedies before bringing a case at the MIC. 
Thirdly, the Court held that the Achmea IST was not common to a number of Member 
States and it did not have any links to the judicial systems of the Member States, such as 
the Benelux Court.69 One could argue that the ICS and the MIC would meet the first crite-
rion since they would be common to a number of Member States. However, would they 
have a link to the Member States or the EU? Furthermore, ISTs under Member State BITs 
with third countries would not be common to a number of Member States. 
It is important to recall that very few outside courts – the EFTA Court and the dis-
pute settlement mechanism in opinion 1/00 on the establishment of a European Com-
mon Aviation Area – were held to be compatible with EU law. Furthermore, the argu-
ments of the Court tend to be very formalistic; the Court mostly adheres to its broad, 
constitutionalist arguments on the need to protect the autonomy of EU law and its basic 
features, even when an interference with them is merely hypothetical. Thus, one cannot 
clearly predict whether the arbitral tribunals mentioned in this section would be com-
patible with EU law. Chances are, looking at how the Court interpreted the limits of Arts 
344 and 267 TFEU, that they would be incompatible with EU law. These extra-EU tribu-
nals or courts would be located outside of the EU or Member State legal systems and 
would not be able to refer a question to the Court of Justice on the application and in-
terpretation of EU law. Furthermore, they would handle disputes involving EU Member 
States that could easily result in binding awards in which EU law is applied and inter-
preted. Therefore, under Art. 351 TFEU Member States would need to remove any in-
compatibilities between their prior BITs with third countries and EU law. Moreover, 
Member States would be under an obligation not to ratify CETA70 and the Commission 
should think twice before pursuing negotiations for a MIC. 
What is certain is that for intra-EU BITs – for which Art. 351 TFEU does not apply –71 
the supremacy of EU law requires Member States to remove all incompatibilities be-
tween them and EU law. This would require the termination of intra-EU BITs and the 
non-application of the Energy Charter Treaty’s arbitration clause in the intra-EU context. 
 
68 Opinion 1/09, cit., para. 72. 
69 Achmea BV [GC], cit., para. 48. 
70 C. ECKES, Don’t Lead with Your Chin!, cit. 
71 Court of Justice, judgment of 22 October 2009, case C-301/08, Bogiatzi v. Deutscher Luftpool, para. 19. 
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v.2.  What about pending and future arbitral proceedings? 
How should arbitral tribunals in pending or future cases brought under intra-EU BITs and 
the Energy Charter Treaty proceed following Achmea? One could argue that as a sign of 
judicial comity they should consider it72 and simply stop pending proceedings or decline 
jurisdiction for future proceedings brought under these agreements. This outcome would 
be favourable to the EU Commission and the respondent Member State. The investor and 
its home Member State, on the other hand, would find such a solution hard to accept, as 
it would restrict a procedural right granted to the investor by an international agreement, 
which is still in force, until it is not terminated together with its “sunset” clause. 
In the award on jurisdiction, the Achmea tribunal briefly considered the possibility73 
that it might not have jurisdiction if Art. 8 of the NL-SK BIT was itself incompatible with 
EU law, since the Association Agreement between the EU and Slovakia, the Slovakian 
Accession Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty are subsequent agreements to the BIT. This pos-
sibility was dismissed because the tribunal interpreted EU law as not prohibiting arbi-
tration under intra-EU BITs. Now, knowing that such arbitration is in fact incompatible 
with EU law, an IST that finds itself in a similar position as the Achmea one could argue 
that it lacks jurisdiction due to the said incompatibility of the successive Association, Ac-
cession or Lisbon Treaty. Still, for this rule to apply the BIT had to be concluded prior to 
the agreements that define the relationship between the Member State and the EU. 
A second, opposite outcome is also possible.74 Since the Court of Justice insists that 
the EU is an autonomous legal order, ISTs could simply regard EU law as domestic law 
that cannot be invoked to justify a breach under an international investment agree-
ment. Investor-state tribunals have a history of upholding their jurisdiction whenever 
the EU Commission relies on EU law arguments to challenge their jurisdiction. There 
have been eight concluded investor-state cases75 thus far that were brought by foreign 
investors against EU Member States under intra-EU BITs or the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), in which the EU Commission intervened directly, either as amicus or as a non-
disputing party, or had voiced its opinion indirectly via a letter to the respondent Mem-
ber State government. The Commission challenged the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribu-
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73 Permanent Court of Arbitration, award on jurisdiction, Achmea, cit., para. 273. 
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nals based on EU law arguments, such as a conflict between a monetary award and 
state aid law, or a conflict with the EU treaties, with the autonomy of EU law or its su-
premacy. Nonetheless, the arbitral tribunals have refused to accept the Commission’s 
arguments in every single case and upheld their jurisdiction, often using strong words 
to argue that they cannot derive their jurisdiction from EU law76 and that the hierarchy 
of norms from the perspective of EU law do not apply under international law.77 
If an arbitral tribunal decides to take this second avenue, then it will not decline its 
jurisdiction and it will render an award. The enforcement of the award in the EU, how-
ever, will be a different matter. If the award was rendered pursuant to the ICSID rules, 
the grounds for challenging it before Member State courts are non-existent. Thus, 
Member States would be under an international obligation to enforce the award. On 
the other hand, in the intra-EU setting, EU law would have primacy over any conflicting 
international obligations of the Member States. If an EU Member State would enforce 
such an award, the Commission would either launch and infringement case or oblige 
the Member State to recover the amount paid as compensation to the investor, as it 
would violate the EU’s state aid rules. If the award was rendered under the UNCITRAL 
rules, then there might be some limited grounds to challenge them before Member 
State courts, because they would breach the Member State’s public policy, of which EU 
law is also a part.78 If the Member State would still pursue the enforcement of the 
award, the same conclusions would apply as the ones previously mentioned for ICSID 
awards. However, if the losing Member States have assets outside of the EU, such as-
sets could potentially be seized so that the foreign investors recover their compensa-
tion awarded by the arbitral tribunals. 
VI. Conclusions 
The Dutch investor is probably wondering what went wrong. The arbitral tribunal de-
cided in its favour under international law, but several years later the Court of Justice 
holds that the said arbitral tribunal is incompatible with EU law. Achmea will be hailed 
by many as putting an end to intra-EU BITs and arbitrations under them, while those 
who have spent money on expensive international arbitrations will curse it. What is cer-
tain is that the Court of Justice has consolidated its attitude on the relationship between 
other international courts and the EU legal order; it set new limits to Art. 344 TFEU; and, 
it expanded its list of tribunals that do not qualify as Member State courts or tribunals 
under Art. 267 TFEU. Nonetheless, whilst the Commission can rejoice that it can now 
clearly oblige Member States to terminate their intra-EU BITs, Achmea sends some wor-
 
76 Permanent Court of Arbitration, award on jurisdiction, Achmea, cit., para. 225. 
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78 Court of Justice, judgment of 1 June 1999, case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton In-
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rying signals. The future of ISTs under Member State BITs with third countries is uncer-
tain; so are the viability of the Investment Court System, the future of the Multilateral 
Investment Court, and the overall coherence of the EU’s international investment law 
and policy. 
 
